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BANKRUPTCY LAW 
BFP u. IMPERIAL SA VINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION: RESOLVING 
THE "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT 
VALUE" STANDARD IN AVOIDING 
FORECLOSURE SALES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In BFP v. Imperial Savings & Loan Association/ the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that when a foreclosure sale is held in compliance 
with applicable state procedural law2 and is non-fraudulent,3 
then the sale is not voidable under the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code.4 In an effort to resolve the conflict between state and fed-
eral law, the Ninth Circuit determined that the focus of judicial 
review of foreclosure sales should be shifted from pricell to pro-
1. BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Ass'n, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992) (per 
Sneed, J., joined by Nelson, J., and Roll, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. granted, 114 
S. Ct. 37 (1993). While this case was pending, the Resolution Trust Corporation was 
appointed receiver of Imperial Savings and Loan Association. The court continued, for 
convenience's sake, to refer to the appellee as Imperial, and this note will do the same. 
2. A foreclosure sale held in compliance with applicable law is referred to by the 
courts as a "regularly conducted" foreclosure sale. In California, section 2924 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code governs foreclosure sale procedures. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West 
1993). 
3. A nonfraudulent foreclosure sale is referred to by the courts as a "noncollusive" 
foreclosure sale. Essentially, the term "noncollusive" describes a good faith foreclosure 
sale. A "collusive" foreclosure sale is one in which the purchaser and debtor act in con-
cert to defraud the debtor's creditors. These types of transactions are the focus of states' 
fraudulent conveyance laws. Such transactions are also clearly voidable under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(l) (1988). 
4. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. 
5. The Federal Bankruptcy Code seeks to protect the debtor in foreclosure, and his 
general creditors, by ensuring that the price received at foreclosure is reasonable. Section 
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cedural compliance.6 
As a result of the Ninth Circuit decision, a non fraudulent 
foreclosure sale is no longer voidable simply because it deprives 
a debtor or his creditors of substantial value.7 In essence, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that where a nonfraudulent foreclosure sale 
is in procedural compliance with state foreclosure law, the fed-
eral standard of reasonably equivalent value8 is also met.B 
The Ninth Circuit's decision has created a split among fed-
eral circuit courts as to the appropriate standard for evaluating 
the fairness of foreclosure sales in bankruptcy cases. The Fifth 
a "reasonably equivalent value." 11 u.s.c. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988) states in pertinent part: 
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of 
the debtor in property, ... that was made or incurred on or 
within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if 
the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily. . . (2)(A) received less 
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such trans-
fer or obligation . . .. 
6. The Ninth Circuit choose to evaluate the fairness of the foreclosure sale based 
strictly on compliance with applicable state procedures. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149 n.7 
("We also agree with the lower courts that the applicable state procedures were com-
plied with in this case and that BFP received adequate notice of the foreclosure under 
California law. ") (emphasis added). 
7. A trustee may seek to avoid a foreclosure sale under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) 
because the amount received at the sale is believed to be less than a reasonably 
equivalent value. For example, an owner of a property with a fair market value of 
$1,000,000 defaults on a loan against his property. The loan balance at the time of de-
fault is $500,000. The lender sells the property, complying with the appropriate proce-
dural statutes, and receives $500,000 from a third party buyer. The sale price satisfies 
the outstanding debt on the property. The amount, however, is only one half the fair 
market value. The original owner, or the original owner's unsecured creditors, might ar-
gue that the equity in the property prior to the forced sale (the difference between the 
fair market value and the forced sale price) was unjustly depleted in the sale. Prior to 
the BFP holding, they could challenge the foreclosure sale as constructively fraudulent 
and avoidable under 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(2)(A) because reasonably equivalent value was 
not received. 
8. "Reasonably equivalent value" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. "Value" is 
defined in 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) (1988) as "property, or satisfaction or securing of a 
present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise 
to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor .... " Therefore, arguably, 
the price received at a mortgage foreclosure, because it is a forced sale, is a good indica-
tion of "reasonably equivalent value" under the circumstances. This rationale seems fair 
in cases such as BFP, where the foreclosure price was sufficient to payoff the antecedent 
debt. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. On the other hand, when a debtor's interest is sold at a 
foreclosure sale for a mere fraction of its fair market value, a convincing argument can be 
made that the sale was not for "reasonably equivalent value." For further discussion of 
reasonably equivalent value, see infra notes 50 to 120 and accompanying text. 
9. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149. 
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and Seventh Circuits, for example, have held that a nonfraudu-
lent, properly conducted foreclosure sale is not necessarily ade-
quate protection for debtors under the Federal Code. lo These 
courts have held that a separate inquiry is necessary to deter-
mine whether the federal requirement of "reasonably equivalent 
value" is established. ll In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's BFP de-
cision declares that a separate inquiry is not necessary where 
procedural compliance with state foreclosure law exists.12 
By effectively preempting the federal statute in state fore-
closure actions, the Ninth Circuit holding draws a clear line be-
tween sales that satisfy the reasonably equivalent value standard 
and those that do not. But by overlooking judicial middle 
ground between the two standards, the Ninth Circuit's holding 
has the effect of making the federal statute illusory. This note 
analyzes the reasoning behind the appellate court decision and 
the court's reliance on what it called "broader considerations."l3 
This note compares the Ninth Circuit holding with a previously 
suggested alternative model which advocates the review of a 
foreclosure sales price only when state foreclosure procedures 
are insufficiently structured to produce a maximum forced sale 
price.14 The conclusion is that both state and federal interests 
can be accommodated without resort to an exclusion of one in 
favor of the other. 
10. See Bundles v. Baker, 865 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "[i)n 
defining reasonably equivalent value, the court should neither grant a conclusive pre-
sumption in favor of a purchaser at a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale, 
nor limit its inquiry to a simple comparison of the sale price to the fair market value 
.... Reasonable equivalence should depend on all the facts of each case."); see also 
Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
price paid at the trustee's sale was not a fair equivalent even though the foreclosure sale 
complied procedurally with state law). 
11. See, e.g., Bundles, 865 F.2d at 824; Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204. 
12. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. 
13. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. The court explained that the stability of the state fore-
closure market and "due regard for traditional state areas of regulation" were considera-
tions which outweighed the concern for a plain language interpretation of §548. Id. 
Moreover, judicial scrutiny and avoidance of properly conducted, non fraudulent sales, 
could create foreclosure market instability. The court's fear is that foreclosure sale bid-
ders would discount their bids to account for the uncertainty of the sale. Thus, the appli-
cation of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A), intended to protect the debtor's assets, could in fact 
have a negative impact upon the value of the debtor's assets by discouraging aggressive 
foreclosure sale bidding. See id. 
14. See infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text. 
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II. F ACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In July of 1987, several parties came together with the in-
tention of purchasing, remodeling, and reselling the Newport 
Beach home of Sheldon and Ann Foreman.1I1 The parties in-
volved were Wayne Pedersen, his wife Marlene, and Russell Bar-
ton. A written agreement was made between the Pedersens and 
Barton in which the Pedersens agreed to buy the Foreman home 
for $356,250 plus some rare coins. I6 In turn, the Pedersens 
agreed to give Barton a 180-day option to purchase the home. In 
exchange for this option, Barton agreed to pay the Pedersens 
twenty-five percent of the profits realized from a later sale of the 
home. I7 
After the sale to the Pedersens entered escrow, the nature 
of the agreement changed. Because of local newspaper reports 
about an investigation of fraudulent rare coin sales by Mr. 
Pedersen, an oral agreement was made between all of the parties 
to restructure the deal. This restructuring included the forma-
tion of a partnership which would purchase the home. I8 The 
BFP partnership was formed with Wayne and Marlene Pedersen 
and Russell Barton as the sole partners. As in the prior arrange-
ment, profits realized on the resale of the home were to be di-
vided seventy-five percent to Barton and twenty-five percent to 
the Pedersens. I9 
On August 27, 1987, the Foremans deeded the property to 
the Pedersens who, on the same day, deeded the property to the 
BFP partnership.20 The $356,250 used to make the purchase was 
borrowed from Imperial Federal Savings and Loan Association 
("Imperial") and was secured by a first deed of trust on the 
15. BFP v. Imperial Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 132 B.R. 748, 749 (Bankr. 9th 
Cir. 1991). 
16. BFP v. Imperial Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 
1992). The value of the coins was not disclosed in the pleadings. 
17. Id. Barton intended to remodel the home for resale. 
18. Id. It is not clear why the partnership was formed. See infra note 20. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. It is' possible the formation of the BFP partnership was an attempt to create 
a "Bona Fide Purchaser" entity. The transfer of the property to the BFP partnership 
might have been intended to insulate the property, and BFP, from a possible voided 
transaction later. See infra note 34 for a discussion of "bona fide purchaser." 
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property.21 In lieu of tendering the rare coins, the BFP partner-
ship issued a six month promissory note to the Foremans in the 
amount of $200,OOO~22 This promissory note was secured by a 
second deed of trust on the property.23 
Concerns created by the investigation of Mr. Pedersen 
proved well founded: Following the purchase of the home from 
the Foremans, Mr. Pedersen conveyed the property not only to 
the BFP partnership, but also to a concern called Off Road Ve-
hicles-Recreation and Family Campground, Inc.24 BFP and the 
Foremans immediately sued to quiet title21i to the property.28 
While this state court action was pending, Imperial "entered a 
notice of default under the first deed of trust"27 and instituted 
foreclosure proceedings on the property.28 In an attempt to se-
cure an automatic stay of this foreclosure proceeding, Off Road 
then filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition on behalf of 
BFP.29 BFP responded by moving to dismiss the involuntary pe-
tition.30 Imperial then moved to lift the automatic stay.31 The 
bankruptcy court granted both of these motions, lifting the stay 
on June 12, 1989, and dismissing the involuntary case on June 
14, 1989.32 
On July 12, 1989, Imperial conducted a foreclosure sale and 
21. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. 
22. [d. It can be inferred that the Foremans, after becoming aware·of the investiga· 




25. A quiet title action is "[a] proceeding to establish the plaintiff's title to land by 
bringing into court an adverse claimant and there compelling him either to establish his 
claim or be forever after estopped from asserting it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (6th 
ed. 1990). 
26. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. 
27. BFP, 132 B.R. 748, 749 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). Payments were not being made 
on the first deed of trust loan. [d. 
28. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. 
29. [d. An involuntary bankruptcy petition allows creditors of an insolvent debtor to 
effectively force the debtor into bankruptcy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 148 (6th ed. 1990); 
see also 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988). 
30. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145; BFP, 132 B.R. at 749. 
31. [d. Under California law, the foreclosure proceeding instituted by Imperial was 
automatically stayed by Off Road's involuntary bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 
(1988). 
32. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. 
5
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sold the property to Paul Osborne for $433,000.33 Mr. Osborne 
had no notice of the title dispute and bought the property in 
good faith. 34 BFP alleges that as a result of the sale it lost its 
equity in the property.311 
On July 21, 1989, the state court in the quiet title action 
announced its intention to settle the dispute by rescinding the 
original 1987 conveyance by the Foremans to the Pedersens.s8 
Damages were to be awarded to both the Foremans and Barton 
against the Pedersens.37 Final judgment on this quiet title action 
was entered on October 12, 1989.38 
After the quiet title decision was announced, BFP, joined by 
the Foremans, filed a second state court action attempting to 
have the foreclosure sale conveyance to Osborne rescinded. 3D 
The suit alleged Imperial did not comply with California foreclo-
sure procedures.4o This second state suit was stayed however, 
when on October 25, 1989, BFP filed for voluntary Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection.41 
BFP then instituted the action which formed the basis of 
the Ninth Circuit decision. In bankruptcy court, BFP attempted 
to have the transfer to Osborne voided.42 On March 6, 1990, the 
33. [d. Imperial was able to proceed with the foreclosure sale because the automatic 
stay had been lifted. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988). 
34. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. The fact that Mr. Osborne purchased the property with-
out notice of the clouded title and in good faith is significant because this gives him 
"bona fide purchaser" status. A "bona fide purchaser" is defined as "[olne who has pur-
chased property for value without any notice of any defects in the title of the seller." 
BUCK'S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (6th ed. 1990). Pursuant to California law, title to the 
property became vested in Mr. Osborne upon delivery and execution of the trustee's 
deed. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1091, 1053, 1054 (Deering 1990). 
35. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. BFP alleges the value of the property was $725,000. 
Since the sale was for $433,000. the equity allegedly lost amounted to $292,000. This 
amount includes the Foremans' $200,000 interest in the property via the second deed of 
trust. 
36. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. 
37. [d. at 1146. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. The Foremans joined BFP in this action because, although the state court 
had ruled the original conveyance to the Pedersens to be void, the Foremans still stood 
to lose their interest in the property (the second deed) because of Osborne's good faith 
purchase at the foreclosure sale. [d. 
40. [d. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West 1993)). 
41. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). 
42. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146. 
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bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint.'3 The eourt also 
ruled that Osborne was a "bona fide purchaser for value, without 
notice,"" and found "no legal authority to set aside the 
sale .... "'11 The bankruptcy court decision was "summarily af-
firmed" by the district court.'6 
BFP appealed on May 9, 1990." On July 10, 1990 the bank-
ruptcy court again ruled in favor of Imperial, granting summary 
judgment.'8 On November 5, 1991, the Ninth Circuit Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court ruling.'9 
43. Id. ("BFP did not make any allegation that Imperial's trustee sale was in viola-
tion of California law ... [or that] the sale was conducted fraudulently or collusively."). 
Under In re Madrid, the party seeking to set aside the transfer must show that the sale 
failed to comply with applicable California law or that the sale was conducted collu-
sively. See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (construing the "reason-
ably equivalent value requirement of Code § 548(a)(2) to mean the same as the consider-
ation received at a non-collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale"), aff'd on 
other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); see infra 
notes 57-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Madrid. 
44. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146; see supra note 34. 
45. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146. 
46.Id. 
47. Id. The record incorrectly notes the date as May 9, 1991. 
48. The court held that BFP did not in fact have a property interest because "the 
Petersons [sic] did not have an interest in property when they purported to transfer the 
title to ... BFP. Therefor [sic], BFP never received good title." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146. 
Without a property interest, the court reasoned, BFP could not seek avoidance under 11 
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). The court also held that there could be no avoidance under 11 
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) because "a reasonably equivalent value was received in exchange 
for the transfer, [and] the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was non-collusive and regularly 
conducted." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146. 
49. BFP, 132 B.R. 748, 751 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
"hesitated to use the state court rescission to determine the interests of these parties or 
to dispose of this appeal." Id. at 749 n.4. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel noted that 
while the bankruptcy court found that BFP had no interest in the property (because of 
the rescission), the "same could be said of Imperial's interest in the property." Id. In-
stead, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed that a noncollusive, regularly conducted 
non-judicial foreclosure sale could not "be challenged as a fraudulent conveyance ... 
[because] such a sale establishes 'reasonably equivalent value' as a matter of law." Id. at 
750 (citing In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)). In addition, the court 
found BFP had received proper notice of the foreclosure sale since "publication for three 
consecutive weeks is sufficient notice, even. where the sale was postponed due to bank-
ruptcy, and not renoticed after bankruptcy ... " Id. (citing Lupertino v. Carbahal, 111 
Cal.Rptr. 112, 115 (Ct. App. 1973)). The court also found BFP's claim, that it was ver-
bally misled by Imperial's attorney into believing the foreclosure sale would not be held 
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III. BACKGROUND 
The Ninth Circuit, and other circuit courts, have developed 
differing approaches to the reasonably equivalent value issue ad-
dressed in BFP. Holdings within the Ninth Circuit have been 
inconsistent. Some courts have followed the 1982 In re Madridr.o 
decision while other courts have parted with its reasoning. Ma-
drid held that a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure 
sale established reasonable equivalence as a matter of law.r.l 
In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance CO.,r.2 a 1980 
decision by the Fifth Circuit, the court held that 57.7% of fair 
market value was not, in that case, a fair equivalent.r.3 Avoidance 
of the trustee sale was justified in Durrett despite compliance 
with applicable state procedural laws.r.4 Since the early eighties, 
many courts have referred to the reasonably equivalent value is-
sue as the Madrid/Durrett debate.r.r. The following provides a 
brief background of the reasonable equivalence issue, as it has 
developed within the Ninth Circuit, and in the other circuits. 
A.. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HISTORY - A DIVIDED CIRCUITr.s 
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel de-
cided In re Madrid.r.7 Madrid held that properly conducted, 
noncollusive foreclosure sales establish reasonably equivalent 
value as a matter of law.r.s In reaching its conclusion, the Appel-
late Panel first examined the Fifth Circuit's holding in Durrettr.9 
which voided a transfer for lack of reasonably equivalent value 
50. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). 
51. Id. at 427. 
52. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). 
53. Id. at 203. 
54. The sale in Durrett was made by the trustee pursuant to the power of sale pro-
vision of the deed of trust. Id. at 204. 
55. See, e.g., Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821. 
56. See In re Haider, 126 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr. D.Mont. 1991) (describing the law 
in the Ninth Circuit regarding the application of Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2)(A) to 
non-judicial foreclosure sales as being in disarray as a result of conflicting decisions from 
the Central and Southern Districts of California). 
57. Madrid, 21 B.R. 424. 
58. Id. at 427. 
59. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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under circumstances involving a voluntary, private transfer.60 
Madrid, which involved an involuntary, public sale, declined to 
follow Durrett because it believed "a regularly conducted sale, 
open to all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against 
the evils of private transfers ... "61 The Madrid court went on to 
conclude that "the law of foreclosure should be harmonized with 
the law of fraudulent conveyances. Compatible results can be 
obtained by construing the reasonably equivalent value require-
ment of Code § 548(a)(2) to mean the same as the consideration 
received at a non-collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure 
sale. "62 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel in Madrid on other grounds.63 
Some Ninth Circuit bankruptcy courts have followed the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision in Madrid while others 
have parted with its holding. The court in In re Verna,6' for ex-
ample, followed Madrid, holding that "where a third party 
purchases property at a non-collusive and regularly conducted 
foreclosure sale, the sale establishes the reasonably equivalent 
value required by Bankruptcy Code section 548."65 The Verna 
court followed the appellate panel in Madrid although it deter-
mined that stare decisis did not apply.66 
60. Madrid, 21 B.R. at 425-26. See infra notes 84-89 and corresponding text for 
discussion of the Durrett holding. 
61. Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426-27. 
62. Id. at 427 (relying on Golden v. Tomiyasu, 387 P.2d 989 (Nev. 1963), and Oller 
v. Sonoma County Land Title Co., 290 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955), for the proposition that 
more than mere inadequacy of price is required to upset a foreclosure sale). 
63. In re Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199. The Ninth Circuit found that the "foreclosure 
sale was not a transfer under § 548(a)" and therefore did "not decide whether the 
amount paid at foreclosure was a reasonably equivalent value." Id. 
64. In re Verna, 58 B.R. 246 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). 
65. Id. at 251. This holding is in line with the Madrid decision. However Verna 
limits its decision to 'third party' purchasers. Madrid did not distinguish between a third 
party purchaser and a trustee purchaser. Madrid, 21 B.R. !It 427. 
66. Verna, 58 B.R. at 251-52 (finding the Madrid Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's rea-
soning persuasive even though it believed the appellate panel's decision was not control-
ling). The 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act ("BAFJA") revised 
the definition of "transfer" to include the foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemp-
tion. See infra note 110. This revision effectively overruled the Ninth Circuit decision in 
Madrid which had affirmed the appellate panel decision because it found the foreclosure 
sale was not a transfer. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199. According to the Verna court, the 
bankruptcy appellate panel decision did not survive the BAFJA amendments. Verna, 58 
B.R. at 251-52. See also Alan S. Gover & Glenn D. West, The Texas Nonjudicial Fore-
closure Process - A Proposal to Reconcile the Procedures Mandated by State Law 
with the Fraudulent Conveyance Principles of The Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J. 1061, 
9
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The court in In re Kachanizadeh67 also followed Madrid. 
Kachanizadeh believed it was bound by stare decisis, stating 
"this court is required to follow the [Madrid] bankruptcyappel-
late panel's holding on this issue."68 Kachanizadeh believed it 
was bound because of the bankruptcy appellate panel decision in 
In re Ehring.69 The Ehring court, although deciding a § 547 
case, "agree[d] with those courts which have found that Madrid 
is still valid law."70 
While Verna, Kachanizadeh, and Ehring followed Madrid, 
other Ninth Circuit bankruptcy courts did not. In Oregon, the 
court in In re Staples71 determined it was not bound by stare 
decisis72 and after an "independent determination of the law"7s 
concluded that the reasoning of the dissent in Madrid was per-
suasive.74 The court held that "the price paid at a regularly con-
ducted foreclosure sale should be accorded, at best, a strong pre-
sumption of adequacy."76 The Staples court emphasized the 
equity concerns involved: "It is not inequitable to require that a 
purchaser who receives a windfall at a foreclosure sale return 
that value to the estate. . .. Buyers wishing to bargain-hunt do 
so at their own risk."76 The court pointed out that if a sale is 
1079 n.139 (1990) (stating that the 1984 bankruptcy amendments did not overrule the 
Madrid appellate panel decision). 
67. 108 B.R. 734 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989). 
68. Kachanizadeh, 108 B.R. at 738. In contrast to the court in Verna, the 
Kachanizadeh court believed the Madrid Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision did sur-
vive the BAFJA amendments. It is worth noting that the court, although it followed the 
Madrid appellate panel, stated that it "believe[d) Lindsay is the better approach." Id. 
See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lindsay. 
69. 91 B.R. 897 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988). 
70. Ehring, 91 B.R. at 901. In dicta, the court also stated: "This argument [that the 
creditor received a windfall when it purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and 
resold it at fair market value) ... should properly be challenged under Section 548 as a 
fraudulent transfer. Even assuming this argument was properly raised before this Panel, 
we find no windfall where the property is sold at the lien value in a non-collusive regu-
larly held foreclosure sale." Id. This dicta in effect restates the holding in Madrid. See 
Madrid, 21 B.R. at 427. 
71. 87 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1988). 
72. Staples, 87 B.R. at 646 (stating that the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision 
in Madrid was not revived when Congress overruled the Ninth Circuit's Madrid 
decision). 
73.Id. 
74. Id. See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting); see also notes 190-
94 and accompanying text for discussion of Madrid dissent. 
75. Staples, 87 B.R. at 646. See contra Leisman v. Tracy, Adv. No. 86-0360 (Bankr. 
D. Or. 1986) (relying on Madrid). 
76. Staples, 87 B.R. at 646. 
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avoided, the good faith purchaser will be protected under § 548 
(C).77 
The court in Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re 
Lindsay)78 also parted with Madrid, suggesting a three-part in-
quiry.79 The first inquiry according to the Lindsay court, should 
be whether the foreclosure sale "was properly conducted in ac-
cordance with state law and was non-collusive."80 The second in-
quiry should go beyond mere compliance with state law and ask 
"whether commercially reasonable steps were taken to achieve 
the best price at the foreclosure."81 And finally, only if the sale is 
deemed to be commercially unreasonable, should the court 
make the third inquiry and analyze evidence of the value of the 
property to determine if less than rellsonably equivalent value 
was received.82 By applying this three-part test, the court stated 
it was "not elevating compliance with state court foreclosure 
standards above all other factors ... [and n]either [was] the 
Court looking solely to percentage of fair market value 
achieved. "83 
These cases demonstrate how Ninth Circuit courts have 
struggled with the reasonably equivalent value issue where the 
value received at foreclosure is very low yet state foreclosure 
77. Id. Section 548(c) (1978) reads in pertinent part: 
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voida· 
ble under this section is voidable under section 544, 
545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a 
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good 
faith has a lien on or may retain any interest trans-
ferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the 
case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obli-
gee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such trans-
fer or obligation. 
78. Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983 (Bankr. 
D.Cal. 1989). 
79. Id. at 991; see also In re Haider, 126 B.R. 796 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991) (applying 
the Lindsay three part test in measuring reasonable equivalence). 
80. This portion of the Lindsay test is equivalent to the Madrid test; see Madrid, 21 
B.R. at 427. 
81. Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 991. This second inquiry, requiring commercial reasonable-
ness at the foreclosure sale, goes beyond Madrid. The Lindsay court states that if com-
mercially reasonable steps are taken by the foreclosing creditor, to achieve the best pos-
sible price at the foreclosure sale, the sale will remain undisturbed even if the price 
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procedures have been followed. Madrid established a bright line 
standard by holding that compliance with state foreclosure pro-
cedures assured reasonably equivalent value. Some Ninth Cir-
cuit courts have followed Madrid, but others have been uncom-
fortable with the Madrid result. The Ninth Circuit decision in 
BFP resolves the issue by essentially reaffirming the holding in 
Madrid. 
B. THE OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS - FROM DURRETT TO BUNDLES 
There has also been a lack of consensus regarding the 
proper application of the reasonably equivalent value standard 
among the other circuits. The Fifth Circuit opened the debate in 
1980. In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance CO.,84 the 
court found that where a parcel of real estate sold at a foreclo-
sure sale for "approximately 57.7 percent of [its] ... fair mar-
ket value,"81i a "fair equivalent" was not received.88 In voiding 
the transfer, the Fifth Circuit used the fraudulent conveyance 
avoiding powers of the Bankruptcy Code for one of the first 
times.87 The Durrett court found that after "review of the entire 
evidence," the foreclosure sale should not stand due to lack of 
fair equivalence.88 In its holding, the court remarked it was una-
ble to find district or appellate court precedent approving a 
transfer of real property for less than seventy percent of market 
value. Because of this commentary by the court, Durrett has 
84. Durrett, 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). 
85. Id. at 203. 
86. Durrett was decided under § 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act which allowed avoid-
ance of transfers in which a "fair equivalent" was not received. Section 548(a)(2)(A), 
enacted in 1978 to replace § 67(d), substitutes the wording "reasonably equivalent 
value" in place of "fair equivalent." The meaning of the two phrases is substantially the 
same. See Ehrlich, supra note 116 at 945 (discussing the change in terminology from 
"fair equivalent" to "reasonably equivalent value"). 
87. Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1073 (noting that despite the existence of 
fraudulent conveyance provisions in the bankruptcy laws since the early 1800's, the pro-
visions do not appear to have been applied to set aside a foreclosure sale prior to the 
Fifth Circuit's holding in Durrett); but see Schafer v. Hammond, 456 F.2d 15 (lOth Cir. 
1972» (where a sale was voided because the value received was determined to be 50% of 
market value). The Durrett court's decision was widely criticized. See, e.g., Lawrence D. 
Coppel & Lewis A. Kahn, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of Transfer, 100 
BANKING L.J, 676 (1983); Robert M. Zinman, James A. Houle, & Alan J. Weiss, Fraudu-
lent Transfers According to Alden, Gross & Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. 
LAW, 977 (1984); see also Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1061 n.9 (listing numerous 
articles that have been written on the Durrett holding). 
88. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203. 
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come to stand for the proposition that a transfer is voidable 
under the fraudulent conveyance statutes when the value re-
ceived is less than seventy percent of market value. While not an 
accurate interpretation of Durrett, it has become the popular 
reading.89 
In re Hulm90 was the next significant Circuit court decision 
on the 'reasonably equivalent value' issue. This Eighth Circuit 
decision came after the Ninth Circuit holding in Madrid and de-
clined to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Appellate PanePl Although the North Dakota Bankruptcy 
Court relied on Madrid and found reasonably equivalent value 
as a matter of law, the Eighth Circuit remanded stating, "we do 
not believe that the sale price at a regularly conducted foreclo-
sure sale, although absent fraud or collusion, can automatically 
be deemed to provide a reasonably equivalent value in exchange 
for the interest of the debtor transferred within the meaning of 
section 548 (a)."92 The court believed an evidentiary hearing was 
needed to provide an answer. 93 
In re Winshall Settlors' Trust94 was decided in 1985. The 
Sixth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit Madrid decision stating 
"the better view is that reasonable equivalence for the purposes 
of a foreclosure sale under § 548(a)(2)(A) should be consonant 
with the state law of fraudulent conveyances."91i The Winshall 
court points to Madrid and what the Winshall court calls the 
"well nigh universal rule that mere inadequacy of price alone 
does not justify setting aside an execution sale . . . there must 
be in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness or op-
pression. . .. "96 The Winshall court found the Durrett holding 
objectionable because it believed that "following the Durrett 
89. The Durrett holding was based on "a review of the entire evidence," not on the 
fact that 57% of estimated market value fell short of 70%. Id. at 204. 
90. Hulm v. Brigham (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984). 
91. Id. at 327. 
92.Id. 
93. Id. The court acknowledged the effect its holding would have on purchasers at 
judicial foreclosure sales, but believed the clear provisions of the bankruptcy code "di-
rect[edl the result. reached." Id. 
94. In re Winshall Settlors' Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985). 
95. Id. at 1139. This statement also appears to be dicta as it is preceded by the 
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holding would radically alter these rules."97 
The Winshall court also recognized the argument of the 
court in In re Richardson.98 The Richardson court argued that 
allowing state law to sanction: 
exchanges in foreclosures which are not reasona-
bly equivalent gives effect to state contract and 
foreclosure policy but may overlook the interests 
of other creditors of the debtor. The determina-
tion of reasonable equivalence should not be con-
trolled by state law ... [it] should be determined 
in light of the function of Section 548 in fostering 
an equitable distribution of the debtor's 
property.BB 
Wins hall contests this argument, agreeing that "the power of . 
the trustee to avoid certain preferential transfers was clearly in-
tended to assure the equitable distribution of a debtor's assets 
among unsecured creditors" but arguing that Congress could not 
have intended "the rights of such creditors necessarily to over-
ride those of good faith purchasers at state foreclosure sales or 
the policy judgments of states in balancing the interests of par-
ties thereto. "100 
In 1988, the Seventh Circuit decided Bundles v. Baker. 101 
After summarizing the holdings in Durrett and Madrid,I°2 the 
Bundles court concluded, in a lengthy analysis, that 
§ 548(a)(2)(A) "establishes a federal basis - independent of state 
law - for setting aside a foreclosure sale."IOs The court found 
that the "unambiguous language" of § 548 "requires the review-
97. [d. The inference is that Durrett is seen as voiding a sale based solely on the 
sale price received. A careful reading of Durrett, however, does not reveal a price only 
analysis. The court's decision was based on "review of the entire evidence." Durrett, 621 
F.2d at 203. 
98. In re Richardson, 23 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). 
99. In re Winshall Settlors' Trust, 758 F.2d at 1139 n.4 (quoting In re Richardson, 
23 B.R. at 447). 
100. Id. C{. Kapela v. Hewman, 649 F.2d 887, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that 
where Bankruptcy Act rules conflict with Article 9 of the U.C.C. relating to secured 
transactions, the conflicting statutes should be interpreted in a way that minimizes the 
conflict and harmonizes the policies that underlie them). 
101. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988). 
102. The court considered Durrett and Madrid the "seminal cases" on the issue. Id. 
at 819. 
103. Id. at 823. 
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ing court to make an independent assessment of whether reason-
able equivalence was given."lo4 
This conclusion is based on a statutory construction analy-
sis. The court cites the Supreme Court in Central Trust Co. v. 
Official Creditors' Committee of Geiger Enterprises,loll which 
counsels that "the meaning of a statute must, in the first in-
stance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and 
if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional author-
ity of the law making body which passed it, the sole function of 
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."106 
In analyzing the language of the statute, the Bundles court 
notes that § 548(a)(2)(A) "makes no distinction between sales 
that do and sales that do not comply with state law."107 To con-
firm that Congress did not intend that § 548 equate reasonable 
equivalence with compliance with state law, the court examined 
the relevant legislative history. lOB Specifically, the court reviewed 
the history surrounding the passage of the 1984 Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act ("BAF JA").109 BAF JA 
was significant because it revised the definition of "transfer" for 
Bankruptcy Code purposes. no A dialogue between Senators Dole 
and DeConcini included several comments expressly confirming 
that the BAF JA Amendments were not meant to affect the 
rights of debtors under the "reasonably equivalent value" stan-
dard in § 548(a)(2)(A).1ll In addition, the BAF JA legislative his-
104. [d. at 821. 
105. Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters. 454 U.S. 354 
(1982) (per curiam) (quoting Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). 
106. [d. at 359-60. 
107. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353 (1984). 
110. BAF JA proposed three changes to the Bankruptcy Code, two of which were 
enacted into law. The two provisions enacted included one revising the definition of 
"transfer" in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code to include the "foreclosure of the debtor's 
equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988). The other change amended § 548 to 
"emphasize its applicability to transfers where the debtor 'voluntarily or involuntarily' 
received less than reasonably equivalent value." Bundles, 856 F.2d at 817 n.4. 
111. The following are excerpts from a scripted colloquy inserted into the Congres-
sional Record by Senators Dole and DeConcini: 
DeConcini: "My understanding is that these provisions were not intended to have 
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tory reveals the withdrawal of an amendment, proposed by Sen-
ator Thurmond, that would have resolved the issue by granting 
an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value 
when certain procedural requirements were met.1l2 
Continuing its analysis, the Bundles court reviewed the 
Ninth Circuit Madrid decision and attempted to reconcile the 
Madrid holding with the language of § 548(a)(2)(A).1l3 The 
Bundles court concluded that Madrid's irrebuttable presump-
tion rule was inconsistent with the federal bankruptcy code in 
three ways.114 First, it found Madrid inconsistent because the 
irrebuttable presumption rule creates, in essence, a judge-made 
"exception to the trustee's avoiding powers under section 
548(a)(2)(A) - an exception not otherwise found in the stat-
ute."m Secondly, the Bundles court found Madrid inconsistent 
because it has the effect of reading "good faith" into 
§ 548(a)(2)(A).1l6 The court found the Madrid holding to imply 
Dole: "The Senator's understanding is correct. . . . Senator Thurmond agreed to 
delete from his amendment all provisions dealing with the Durrett issue. . .. [N)o pro-
vision of the bankruptcy bill passed by this body was intended to intimate any view one 
way or the other regarding the correctness of the position taken. . . in the Durrett case, 
or ... [in) Madrid, ... which reached a contrary result . 
. . . [T)he amendment[s) should not be construed to in any way codify Durrett or 
throw a cloud over noncollusive foreclosure sales . 
. . . Finally, neither of the [amendments) purport to deal with the question of 
whether a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale should be deemed to be for 
a reasonably equivalent value." 
See Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821 n.8 (citing 130 Cong.Rec. § 13,771-13,772 ((Daily ed.) No. 
131, Pt. II, October 5, 1984); see also In re Verna, 58 B.R. at 250. 
112. In re Verna, 58 B.R. at 250. Senator Metzenbaum had objected to the inclusion 
of the last proposed amendment because "this issue had not been considered in commit-
tee." See also In re Kachmizadeh, 108 B.R. 734, 738 (stating the 1984 BAFJA amend-
ments did not address the reasonably equivalent value issue). 
113. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (citing In re Richardson 23 B.R. 434, 446 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (stating 
that an irrebuttable presumption of reasonable equivalence for non collusive, regularly 
conducted public sales "proscribes" the factual inquiry into reasonable equivalence 
which § 548(a)(2) was designed to facilitate); see also In re Madrid 21 B.R. at 428 
(Volinn, J., dissenting) (stating that an irrebuttable presumption of reasonable equiva-
lence excises "vital language" from § 548). 
116. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. See also Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure 
Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 933, 945 (1985). Ehrlich analyzes the appearance of the "reasonably equivalent 
value" terminology in § 548 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code as a replacement for the "fair 
consideration" language of section 67d(2) of the old Code. He concludes that the switch 
in phraseology "was an attempt to remove subjective considerations, such as good faith, 
as criteria for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers." (emphasis added). Id. 
16
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this good faith condition because "as long as the sale is con-
ducted in good faith and in accordance with state law, the sale 
price is conclusively presumed to be a reasonably equivalent 
value."l17 The Bundles court found such a result "inconsistent 
with section 548(a)(2)'s purpose of permitting the trustee to 
avoid transfers as constructively fraudulent, irrespective of the 
parties' actual intent."118 The Bundles court emphasized that 
reading "good faith" into § 548 (a)(2) was inconsistent with the 
section's purpose of allowing avoidance of constructionally 
fraudulent transfers.119 Finally, the Bundles court found Madrid 
inconsistent with § 548 because "an irrebuttable presumption 
renders section 548(a)(2) merely duplicative of other Code provi-
sions such as section 548(a)(1) and 544(b)."120 
The Bundles decision offers a recent and extensive analysis 
of the reasonably equivalent value issue and represents the pre-
sent law in the Seventh Circuit. Since Durrett in 1980, the vari-
ous circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have attempted 
to formulate a workable rule of law with regard to the applica-
tion of § 548(a)(2)(A). The courts have struggled to balance the 
interests represented by the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent con-
veyance statutes with equally important concerns for stability in 
the state foreclosure markets. These efforts have resulted in a 
split among the circuits as evidenced by the above cases. 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Association,121 the 
Ninth Circuit settled two issues. First, the court held that the 
BFP partnership did in fact have a property interest in the 
Foreman home as a result of the state court ruling quieting title 
117. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. 
118. Id; see 4 L. King, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 11 548.02-03 (15th ed. 1988); see also 
Ehrlich, supra note 116, at 956 (supporting the Bundles court analysis). 
119. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. 
120. Id. The court points out that such a reading would make § 548(a)(2)(A) redun-
dant in the sense that section 548(a)(1) already allows for avoidance of transfers "with 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity .... " Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823 
n.13. Section 544(b) provides "the trustee may avoid any transfer ... that is voidable 
under applicable law .... " 856 F.2d at 823 n.14. 
121. BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 37 (1993). 
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in favor of the BFP partnership and the Foremans.122 The find-
ing of a property interest was a necessary element in allowing 
BFP to seek avoidance of the transfer under § 548(a)(2). The 
Ninth Circuit gave the state court holding "full faith and 
credit"123 as a valid judgment despite finding the state court's 
reasoning "difficult to follow."124 Secondly, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel holding 
that the "price received at a non-collusive, regularly conducted 
foreclosure sale established irrebuttably reasonably equivalent 
value under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)."1211 This holding is 
squarely in line with the long standing Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel decision in In re Madrid.128 
A. BFP PROPERTY INTEREST EXISTED 
The Ninth Circuit held that the state court judgment quiet-
ing title in favor of BFP and the Foremans (as against all 
others) would stand, and did create a property interest in 
BFP .127 The court affirmed the state court quiet title judgment 
in spite of the state court's unclear reasoning. us 
Imperial argued that BFP did not obtain good title to the 
property because of the earlier state court ruling rescinding the 
sale of the home from Foreman to Pedersen.129 Imperial also 
pointed out that the Pedersens, whose fraudulent behavior 
caused the rescission of the deed from Foreman to Pedersen, 
122. In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144, 1147·48 (9th Cir. 1992). 
123. Id. at 1147. 
124. Id. The Ninth Circuit described the unclear reasoning of the state court: 
The state court seems to hold that the Foreman-Pedersen 
deed became avoidable by a failure of consideration caused by 
the Pedersens .... There is language in the judgment that 
implies that the failure of consideration took place as a result 
of the Pedersen's subsequent breach of both the BFP partner-
ship agreement and contractual duties owed to the Foremans. 
How this breach would cause a failure of consideration, as that 
concept is normally understood, or how the breach would af-
fect the original grant, is not explained. 
BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148 n.3. 
125. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. 
126. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). 
127. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147-48. 
128. Id. at 1147 n.3. 
129. [d. at 1147. 
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were general partners in BFP. Therefore, Imperial argued, BFP 
should not have been able to obtain "bona fide purchaser" sta-
tus since knowledge of the fraud would be imputed to BFP 
under California partnership law.130 The Ninth Circuit implicitly 
acknowledged that both arguments were sound and that neither 
was clearly resolved by the lower courtS.13l In addition, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that the state court ruling seemed to con-
fuse the consideration issue with the Pedersen's fraudulent be-
havior.132 The Ninth Circuit did not attempt to harmonize all of 
the language or judgments of the lower courts. Instead, the court 
resolved the issue by affirming the state court quiet title judg-
ment in favor of BFP and confirming BFP's interest in the prop-
erty at the time of the foreclosure sale.133 
B. REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE RECEIVED 
The Ninth Circuit, acknowledging the issue was a "close 
one,"134 affirmed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate 
Pimel which found reasonably equivalent value to exist irrebut-
tably when a noncollusive, regularly conducted state foreclosure 
sale is held. 131i This decision follows the reasoning of the earlier 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision in In re Madrid. 136 It is 
also in line with the decision in In re Winshall Settlor's 
Trust,137 in which the Sixth Circuit stated "the better view is 
that reasonable equivalence for the purposes of a foreclosure 
sale under § 548(a)(2)(A) should be consonant with the state 
law of fraudulent conveyance."138 
The Ninth Circuit conceded its decision was at odds with 
both the Seventh Circuit decision in Bundles, and the Fifth Cir-
130. [d. at 1147 n.2. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15,012 (Deering 1979). 
131. The bankruptcy court ruled that BFP did not have a property interest because 
of the prior rescission. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel chose to avoid addressing this 
ruling because by the same reasoning, Imperial would also lack a property interest. See 
supra note 49. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged these arguments by Imperial but pre-
ferred to set these "legal arguments aside." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147. 
132. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147 n.3. 
133. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147-48. 
134. [d. at 1148. 
135. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149. 
136. Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). 
137. In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985). 
138. Id. at 1139. 
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cuit decision in Durrett. ls9 It explained that the analyses of 
these two courts rested "on a plain language interpretation of 
§ 548(a)(2)"140 and call for a determination of reasonable equiv-
alence "depend[ing] on all the facts of each case."l41 The Ninth 
Circuit noted the Bundles court's argument that the granting of 
an irrebuttable presumption, in effect, creates a judicial excep-
tion to the avoiding powers of § 548.142 This exception, the 
Ninth Circuit pointed out, undermines the ability of the debtor 
or trustee to recover lost equity, the very purpose of the § 548 
avoiding power .14S 
The Ninth Circuit recognized the "persuasive"l" position 
represented by these contrary cases, but reasoned that "broader 
considerations require a different result.m4Ci The court concluded 
that the stability of the state foreclosure market and "due re-
gard for traditional state areas of regulation"146 were considera-
tions which outweighed the concerns expressed by the Bundles 
and Durrett courts and their plain language interpretations of 
§ 548.147 The court stated that by using the "Madrid formula-
tion, [it is] able to balance bankruptcy policy and comity con-
cerns."149 Furthermore, the court cited support for its position 
within both the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Bar Association.149 
V. CRITIQUE 
While acknowledging the merit of a plain language interpre-
tation of § 548(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit nevertheless determined, 
III BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Association/Cio that 
139. BFP. 974 F.2d at 1148. 
140. Id. (citing In re Bundles. 856 F.2d 815. 824 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
141. BFP. 974 F.2d at 1148 n.5 (quoting Bundles. 856 F.2d at 824). 
142. Id. (citing Bundles. 856 F.2d at 823). 
143. Id. 
144. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. 
145. Id. 
146. BFP. 974 F.2d at 1149. 
147. Id. at 1148-49. 
148. Id. at 1149. 
149. Id. at 1149 n.6. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(b) (West 1984); 
see also 1983 A.B.A. SEC. OF REAL PROP. REP. 106B. 
150. BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP). 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. granted. 114 S. Ct. 37 (1993). 
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"broader considerations require a different result."UH The rea-
soning behind the Ninth Circuit decision then, lies in the sub-
stance of these "broader considerations." 
A. THE POTENTIAL DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF ApPLICATION OF 
§ 548(a)(2)(A) ON STATE FORECLOSURE MARKETS 
First, the Ninth Circuit voiced concern that "allowing a 
bankruptcy court to undo a foreclosure sale carries with it the 
strong potential to destabilize state mortgage transactions."1112 
Quoting Professor Ehrlich in his article Avoidance of Foreclo-
sure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State 
and Federal Objectives,1113 the Ninth Circuit points to the 
problems created from both federal and state perspectives: 
The prospect that trial courts will determine rea-
sonable equivalence on a case-by-case basis is un-
tenable from both federal and state perspectives. 
From the state viewpoint, an ad-hoc approach 
produces intolerable uncertainty regarding the fi-
nality of any purchase at a foreclosure sale . . . . 
From a federal perspective, this uncertainty un-
dermines the price-maximizing objectives of sec-
tion 548(a)(2) because potential buyers will dis-
count their [bids] ... to reflect this 
uncertainty. 1114 
This assessment by Professor Ehrlich captures the nature of 
the dilemma faced by courts endeavoring to effectively apply 
§ 548 without defeating its purpose. By avoiding transfers for 
lack of reasonably equivalent value, courts could potentially be 
decreasing the amounts bid at future foreclosure sales by creat-
ing doubt about the finality of any given transaction. Such 
doubt can create instability in foreclosure markets and decrease 
the number of willing, aggressive purchasers. When demand at 
151. [d. at 1148. The two considerations identified by the court are: 1) the instabil-
ity created in foreclosure markets when a foreclosure sale is undone by a bankruptcy 
court, and 2) the tension that exists in balancing the interests of the federal Bankruptcy 
Code with state foreclosure law. [d. 
152. [d. . 
153. Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: 
Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933 (1985). 
154. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148 (citing Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 963-64). 
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forced sales is lower, prices received will inevitably fall. The 
great concern the Ninth Circuit expressed for the potentially de-
stabilizing effect of overturning foreclosure sales through case-
by-case application of § 548(a)(2)(A) is clearly valid. Most cir-
cuit court opinions on the § 548 issue address this concern. m 
However, it is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit, while relying 
on Professor Ehrlich's concise assessment of the problem, ig-
nored his proposed solution. It is especially worthy of note be-
cause the ultimate BFP holding is inconsistent with Ehrlich's 
thesis. 
Professor Ehrlich is concerned about the destabilizing, un-
dermining effects of case-by-case trial court analysis and sug-
gests that "federal courts must be sensitive to the context in 
which the transfer occurred and the disruptive effects of post 
foreclosure avoidance on real estate transactions."11l6 Impor-
tantly, he also recognizes that "the purpose and function of sec-
tion 548(a)(2) is precisely to allow the trustee to pierce the final-
ity of the foreclosure sale."11l7 Professor Ehrlich's proposed 
solution is a compromise: "The courts should limit the scope of 
section 548(a)(2) review to an initial evaluation of the state fore-
closure procedures, rather than to the quantitative sufficiency 
of the bid received at sale."11l8 As a result, the trustee must meet 
a "double burden."11l9 First, the trustee must show that "state 
foreclosure procedures are insufficiently structured to produce a 
maximum forced sale price,"l60 and second, if the foreclosure 
procedures are inadequate, "the trustee must also prove that the 
sale price was less than a reasonably equivalent value."lsl Thus, 
155. See, e.g., In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[C]reation of a de 
facto right of redemption would significantly chill participation at foreclosure sales, 
where sale prices ... already are frequently lower than the actual value of the property 
sold."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 823, n.12 (7th Cir. 
1988) ("[The] central policy concern expressed in the opinions is that permitting avoid-
ance of foreclosure sales under § 548(a)(2) would have a negative effect on the foreclo-
sure market."). 
156. Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 966. 
157. Id. at 962. 
158. [d. (emphasis added). 
159. [d. at 967. 
160. Id. 
161. [d. Ehrlich also states that "[i]n making this determination, however, the 
courts must recognize that due to the failings of state procedures, no rational forced sale 
value is available for comparative use, and the courts should apply section 548 strictly, 
using the retail market value of the property for comparative purposes." Id. 
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under Professor Ehrlich's proposed system of judicial review, 
"federal courts should continue, as many have done, to enforce 
section 548 in accordance with its terms until state procedures 
are revamped."162 This proposed system attempts to address the 
state and federal concerns, while sustaining the authority of 
§ 548(a)(2) and the policies it embodies.163 . 
In contrast, while the Ninth Circuit holding does address 
the state and federal concerns about uncertainty in the foreclo-
sure markets, it does so at the expense of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Code's authority. To the extent that compliance with 
'regular' state foreclosure procedures creates an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of reasonably equivalent value received, § 548(a)(2) is 
stripped of its capacity to "pierce the finality of the foreclosure 
sale. "164 Professor Ehrlich's model, focusing on the sufficiency of 
existing state foreclosure sale procedures, rather than on price, 
seeks to interpret § 548(a) (2) in a way that will lessen the po-
tential for uncertainty in foreclosure markets and, at the same 
time, keep the avoiding power of § 548 alive. The Ninth Circuit 
holding effectively eliminates the avoiding power of § 548 by 
telling the courts: "You may not, under § 548(a)(2), undo any 
foreclosure sale that complies with applicable law and is non-
collusive." 
There are two problems with the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of § 548(a)(2). First, a judicial interpretation of § 548(a)(2) 
which renders it ineffective is arguably beyond the Ninth Cir-
cuit's proper power.16~ The concern over foreclosure market in-
stability is essentially a policy concern. It is well settled that 
when policy concerns call for an outcome that directly conflicts 
with the intentions of an unambiguous federal statute, the call is 
162. Id. 
163. Ehrlich is suggesting that the courts use § 548 to indirectly monitor the rea-
sonably equivalent value standard by beginning the judicial inquiry with attention to the 
procedures in place within the state. In this way, the courts can employ § 548(a)(2), 
protecting the interests of the debtor (and his or her unsecured creditors), and at the 
same time, provide the foreclosure markets with some degree of insulation, so that price 
alone will not void a transfer. Instead, a combination of inadequate procedures and in-
sufficient price would be required to avoid a sale. 
164. Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 962. 
165. The Bundles court expressed clearly the court's duty stating: "Congress has set 
forth a federal standard. We must giue effect to that congressional will, however ambig-
uous its manifestation." Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 822 (emphasis added). 
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for congressional action, not judicial action. ISS Courts and com-
mentators analyzing § 548(a)(2) cases have, for the most part, 
come to the same conclusion. ls7 
Secondly, under this Ninth Circuit holding, § 548(a)(2) 
ceases to be an impetus to improve state foreclosure sale proce-
dures. Importantly, it is these procedures which, in the long run, 
generate higher foreclosure sale prices. ISS There is no longer an 
impetus because, under BFP, so long as the foreclosure sale is 
regular and noncollusive, there no longer exists the threat of 
avoidance for lack of reasonably equivalent value received under 
§ 548(a)(2)}S9 Where there is no threat of avoidance, there is no 
incentive to improve the methods which generate the sale price 
received.170 
166. See, e.g., Solberg v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460 (Cal. 1977) ("When stat-
utory language is ... clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and 
courts should not indulge in it."). 
167. See, e.g., Bundles, 956 F.2d at 823 ("Any change deemed desirable on policy 
grounds should be addressed to Congress rather than to this court."); In re Hulm, 738 
F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1984) ("The Bankruptcy Code provisions are clear .... [P)olicy 
considerations cannot affect the outcome in this case, but must be addressed, if at all, by 
Congress."); Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 n.1 (Volinn, J., dissenting) (defining the issue as 
essentially a policy concern that should probably be dealt with legislatively); Ellen A. 
Feinberg, Durrett, After the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 59 JUL Fla. 
B.J. 41 (noting the detrimental effects on the stability of titles purchased at foreclosure 
sales and suggesting that Congress, not the judiciary, should address policy considera-
tions by amending the Bankruptcy Code); but see Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(expressing by its holding the belief that judicial action is appropriate); see In re Win-
shall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985) (following the holding in Madrid). 
168. See infra notes 173-178 and related text for discussion of the effect of im-
proved foreclosure sale procedures on sale prices received. 
169. In contrast, under Professor Ehrlich's system, § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code continues to act as an impetus to the equitable distribution of the debtor's prop-
erty. Under Professor Ehrlich's model, the courts will ultimately evaluate the foreclosure 
sale price to determine if it is reasonably equivalent value. This is done only when, in the 
court's judgment, the state foreclosure procedures are not structured in a way that maxi-
mizes the foreclosure sale price; Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 967. 
170. To be sure, there could be other incentives to improving foreclosure sale proce-
dures. But under this Ninth Circuit holding, § 548(a)(2) would not provide an incentive. 
Section 548's value as an impetus to improving foreclosure procedures can be seen in a 
hypothetical example: 
State A's foreclosure procedures are inadequate and consist-
ently result in low foreclosure sale prices. State B's foreclosure 
sale procedures are effective and consistently result in rela-
tively higher foreclosure sale prices received. Section 
548(a)(2)'s avoiding powers would be used successfully more 
often in State A, where a reasonably equivalent value is rarely 
received. This would encourage State A to improve it's foreclo-
sure procedures to avoid the disruptive effects of § 548 
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The Ninth Circuit decision, by creating an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of reasonably equivalent value, removes the destabi-
lizing effect of § 548(a)(2) avoidances on state foreclosure mar-
kets. In theory, more stable foreclosure markets should lead to 
higher prices received. But at the same time, the Ninth Circuit 
must be aware that in effectively erasing the avoiding power of 
§ 548(a)(2), the court is also removing a force which would also 
lead to higher prices received. 
While the Ninth Circuit cites Professor Ehrlich's model,171 
the idea that efforts to increase the price received at a forced 
sale should focus on improving the procedures surrounding the 
sale has wide support among other commentators as well. 172 
Many commentators have identified the need for more effective 
procedures in state foreclosure proceedings.173 Some have sug-
gested improved quality and scope of foreclosure sale publica-
tion through the use of readily available marketing systems.174 
Other suggestions include the allowance of time for due dili-
gence. Such allowance would increase bid prices by removing 
buyer concerns over title status and property conditions which 
exist in typical foreclosure proceedings. l7II The creation of a sys-
application. 
171. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. Professor Ehrlich's model suggests that § 548(a)(2) be 
used, in effect, to police the procedures surrounding the foreclosure sale rather than to 
police the price received at the sale. Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 965-66. 
172. See generally, Ehrlich, supra note 153 (focusing on judicial review of state pro-
cedures rather than of value received at foreclosure sales); Gover & West, supra note 64 
(addressing the need for reform in the Texas state foreclosure process); Steven Wechsler, 
Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure By Sale As De Facto Strict Foreclosure - An 
Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 
850, 870-71 (1985) (presenting a study showing inefficiencies in state foreclosure proce-
dures and suggesting that further study and experimentation should be undertaken to 
improve the foreclosure sale process). 
173. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text. 
174. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 977 ("In most jurisdictions, notice of the 
foreclosure sale is usually obscured in the legal notice section of a local newspaper and, 
perhaps, posted on the courthouse bulletin board and on the property .... The inade-
quacy of the advertising function of contemporary state notice requirements seems par-
ticularly inexcusable in light of the availability of ordinary market mechanisms to adver-
tise the sale without substantial additional costs."); Gover & West, supra note 66, at 
1087 (suggesting that the trustee should list the property with a licensed real estate bro-
ker on or before the posting date since a competent real estate broker would know how 
best to advertise the property for sale and has an incentive for marketing the property to 
the best advantage of both the lender and the debtor). 
175. See Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 979 (arguing that a "presale title report" should 
be made available to potential bidders and that "a reasonable period of time" be allowed 
to close the sale); see also Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1087 (suggesting the success-
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tern with available financing would necessarily broaden the po-
tential purchaser market.t76 These suggested changes, many of 
which are reasonable and can be easily implemented, must be 
tempered by concerns for the timing and certainty of the fore-
closure sale process.177 The trustee cannot be expected to bear 
the financial burden of a cumbersome foreclosure process.178 
This note does not attempt to catalogue the inadequacies 
that exist in the various state foreclosure procedures. Nor does it 
note all of the proposed solutions. Suffice it to say that the large 
volume of writings on the inadequacy of the foreclosure proce-
dures in many different states, lends great support to the pro-
position that the elimination of § 548(a)(2) as an impetus to im-
proving state foreclosure procedures is unwise.179 
B. BALANCING STATE AND FEDERAL COMITY CONCERNS 
The second of the Ninth Circuit's broad considerations was 
"the growing tension between preemption and the requirements 
of a vigorous federal system."180 Essentially the court is identify-
ing the comity181 concerns involved in § 548(a) (2) cases. The 
court claimed that it saw the issue as one of both "statutory in-
terpretation" and this "growing tension."182 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that "by following the Madrid formulation we are 
able to give a reasonable meaning to § 548 without unduly up-
setting ... state law."183 By use of the Madrid formula, "we are 
ful bidder be required to deposit with the trustee at least ten percent of the bid price 
and enter into a contract containing customary terms and conditions). 
176. See Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 978 (stating that the cash bid requirement at 
the foreclosure sale virtually eliminates all persons from bidding at the sale except pro-
fessional foreclosure specialists). 
177. See Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1087 (recognizing the revised procedures 
advocated could burden or 'clog' the debtors equity of redemption). 
178. Present value considerations should also be a part of the "reasonably 
equivalent value" formula. See Gover & West, supra note 66. 
179. See text accompanying notes 174-78. 
180. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149. This tension apparently refers to the conflict between 
state law and "vigorous" federal statutory law. [d. 
181. "Comity" is defined as: "In general, the principle of 'comity' is that courts of 
one. . . jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another ... jurisdic-
tion, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). When the federal court defers to state law in its 
interpretation of § 548, as it has in BFP, the principle of comity is present. 
182. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149. 
183. [d. 
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able to balance bankruptcy policy and comity concerns. "184 
The Ninth Circuit decision does avoid 'unduly upsetting' 
state law. The court's irrebuttable presumption interpretation 
results in a federal standard of reasonably equivalent value that 
is essentially subsumed under state law. If state law is satisfied, 
the reasonably equivalent value standard is satisfied, without 
further inquiry. However, the question remains: "Does this in-
terpretation give 'reasonable meaning' to the federal statute?" 
There is strong argument, presented in the Bundles decision and 
recognized by the Ninth Circuit as "persuasive," that such an 
interpretation gives the federal statute essentially no meaning.181! 
It is difficult to understand the Ninth Circuit's reasoning here. 
In one paragraph, the court recognized as "persuasive" the Bun-
dles court position that an irrebuttable presumption creates a 
judicial exception which undermines the purpose of the § 548 
avoiding powers.186 In the next paragraph, the court claimed 
that such an interpretation gives 'reasonable meaning' to the 
statute.187 The Ninth Circuit provides no real analytical support 
for this conclusion. Neither is there any real analysis to support 
the court's conclusion that it has balanced bankruptcy policy 
and comity concerns. 
The Ninth Circuit sought support for its deferential posi-
tion in the Supreme Court case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group.188 
Cipollone emphasized that "interpretation of federal statutes 
should be tempered with due regard for traditional state areas of 
regulation."l89 It can be argued, that in interpreting 
§ 548(a)(2)(A), the court went further in the BFP holding than 
184. Id. 
185. The Bundles court recognized the irrebuttable presumption interpretation as 
inconsistent with the language of § 548. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. The Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged the strength of the Bundles court's reasoning stating: "The [Bundles 
court's) position is persuasive but we think that broader considerations require a differ-
ent result." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. Bundles also cites the dissent of Justice Volinn in In 
re Madrid ("The majority has excised vital language from § 548 in order to create an 
exception to the statute .... "), In re Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 (Volinn J., dissenting); and 
In re Richardson ("[An I)rrebuttable presumption ... proscribes the factual inquiry 
... § 548(a)(2) was designed to facilitate.") In re Richardson, 23 B.R. 434, 446 (Bankr. 
D.Utah 1982). 
186. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. 
187. Id. 
188. Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992). 
189. Id. at 2617-18. 
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is suggested by the Cipollone Court. Cipollone counseled the 
courts to proceed with due regard when federal statutes apply in 
areas where state regulation is traditional. The state foreclosure 
markets are such areas. What the Ninth Circuit accomplished 
with its holding is not, however, an expression of due regard. In 
accommodating the state law in this area of traditional state reg-
ulation, BFP effectively preempts the federal statute. The Ma-
drid dissent argued that "with a conclusive or irrebuttable pre-
sumption of reasonableness. . . the majority's logic in applying 
§ 548 as a factor in its decision is illusory."ISO 
Judge Volinn's dissent in Madrid also set forth an interpre-
tation of the § 548 standard which seems to satisfy Cipollone's 
call for "due regard for traditional state areas of regulation."lsl 
Judge Volinn suggested giving a "strong presumption of ade-
quacy" for value received where state foreclosure procedures are 
followed in a non-collusive foreclosure sale.192 Such an interpre-
tation properly places state and federal concerns on unequal 
footing: deference, by way of the strong presumption, is made to 
state regulations. ISS At the same time, such a reading does not 
make the federal statute "illusory."ls. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Association/Sf> the 
Ninth Circuit held that the price received at a nonfraudulent 
foreclosure sale, when conducted in compliance with applicable 
procedural law, satisfies the reasonably equivalent value stan-
dard of § 548(a)(2) as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit opin-
ion was heavily influenced by concerns for certainty. in the state 
190. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting). 
191. In re BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149. 
192. Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428; see also In re Grissom, 955 F.2d 1440, 1446 (11th Cir. 
1992) (stating that absent fraud, collusion, or irregular procedures, the courts should 
presume that a legitimate foreclosure sale brings a price which is reasonably equivalent 
to the property's value). 
193. See Grissom, 955 F.2d at 1449 ("[Only by) conduct[ing) a thorough inquiry of 
all relevant facts and circumstances . . . . do we provide adequate deference to state 
foreclosure proceedings and the rights of secured creditors, without unduly trammeling 
upon the policies of the bankruptcy laws.") (emphasis added). This statement supports 
the notion that deference, or 'due regard,' can be paid to state foreclosure law while 
thorough inquiries are made under § 548. 
194. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 428 (Volinn, J. dissenting) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). 
195. 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 37 (1993). 
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foreclosure markets. To assure certainty and stability in these 
markets, the Ninth Circuit equated compliance with state fore-
closure law, in a nonfraudulent setting, to reasonable equiva-
lence for purposes of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 
The holding is troubling, however, because the court over-
looked judicial middle ground which would give meaning to the 
federal standard of "reasonably equivalent value" and, at the 
same time, maintain stability in the state foreclosure markets. 
Judicial scrutiny, focusing on the quality of the state foreclosure 
procedures, rather than on mere compliance with the proce-
dures, or on the quantitative price received at sale, can accom-
plish this aim. Courts, such as In re Lindsay,196 and commenta-
tors, such as Professor Ehrlich,197 have described this middle 
ground. 
In addition, the question is raised, whether the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in departing from a plain language interpretation of 
§ 548(a)(2), went too far in its judicial capacity. In trying to bal-
ance state and federal interests, without unduly upsetting state 
law, the Ninth Circuit stripped the Bankruptcy Code's reasona-
bly equivalent value standard of its meaning. When a federal 
statute is interpreted judicially in such a way that it loses its 
meaning, the call for legislative action is loud and clear. 
Kevin F. Kilty* 
196. In re Lindsay, 98 B.R. 983 (Bankr. S.D.Cal. 1989) (proposing a three· part test 
which included commercial reasonableness as a factor). See supra notes 78·83 and ac· 
companying text. 
197. Ehrlich, supra note 153 at 965·66 (suggesting the courts focus on a review of 
the procedural aspects of the foreclosure sale rather than on the price received at the 
sale). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. 
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